Clinton's foreign policy enigma: An essay on domestic confusion
Jun 11 '02
The Bottom Line Final Recommendation? For what? Um, don't elect Clinton again, lol....
This is my first submission to the 'writer's corner' section of Epinions, and it is an essay on the Clinton Administration's lack of direction in foreign policy.
The textual references come from David Halberstam's War in a Time of Peace, which I have also reviewed.
~Thanks
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Perhaps the most telling statement regarding foreign policy issues comes from Lee Hamilton, head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. “Every president’s tenure,” he said, “is marked by foreign policy issues, whether they want it to or not. It just happens that way” (Halberstam 168). This statement rang true for the Clinton administration as well. Whereas Clinton may have entered the White House focusing on domestic policy ‘like a laser-beam,’ it was his dependence on domestic consequences that pulled him into the foreign arena. Whether it was because of economic promises or his political image at home, Clinton could not afford to ignore foreign policy issues. The truth was, foreign issues could make or break his entire domestic agenda, and thus he unwillingly devoted considerable political capital to them. While no one cause can explain the administration’s action on every issue, each has a common thread connecting it to Clinton’s domestic political agenda. Two prime examples of such a thread are Clinton’s support of multilateral institutions such as NAFTA as well as his actions in the Balkans.
Nowhere was the Clinton agenda more evident than in his support of NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement. As David Halberstam notes, “For Clinton [foreign policy] was an inconvenience, something that might pull him away from his primary job at hand-domestic issues, above all the economy” (192). The difference, however, is that NAFTA provided a chance for Clinton to combine foreign policy with domestic issues and promises. Promoting freer trade across boundaries allowed Clinton to combine his overall goal of trade liberalization and geo-economics with a pressing domestic issue, essentially killing two birds with one stone. With regard to NAFTA, Clinton noticed a twofold effect: he could address the growing immigration problem and, as Peter Trubowitz explains, gain bargaining power against industrialized rivals like Germany and Japan throughout the Uruguay round of GATT (Trubowitz, lecture).
A second example of the domestic and political implications underlying Clinton’s foreign policy agenda can be seen in the Balkans. The administration may have been hesitant to get involved in eastern Europe, but those attitudes soon changed after the growing massacres in Srebrenica began to hit home. “Srebrenica,” as Halberstam notes, “as much as any one town, acted as kind of a goad, mocking this new president, who had promised to represent a more humane America, not just domestically but in foreign policy as well” (Halberstam 201). It would be a mistake, however, to disregard the domestic and economic implications of action in the Balkans. Most notably, any prolonged war effort would skew the promises for balanced budgets and responsible spending. This budget constraint once again shows how Clinton was forced into a particular foreign policy commitment partly as a result of domestic assurances. Halberstam remarks, “The Clinton people had escalated Bosnia as an issue during the campaign … [but they] had already decided that domestic issues were of a far higher priority politically, and [were] loath to place his future domestic policies – all centered around the health of the economy – at risk” (225-6). This provides a solid example of how a seemingly isolated foreign policy incident was, in all actuality, influenced by domestic considerations. When a tentative agreement was finally reached with the Dayton accords, Halberstam relates the experience as “a waffle of the first order, done strictly for domestic political considerations…. They had dealt with Bosnia because it had the potential to go from a foreign policy disaster to a domestic political problem” (359-60).
Certain foreign policy actions, or inactions, could be argued outside of the realm of domestic political implications. Some may contend that Clinton’s inaction in Somalia, the subsequent inaction in Rwanda, and the situation in Haiti have no correlation to underlying domestic considerations. However, a closer look reveals that the administration did, in fact, place considerable emphasis on domestic consequences before acting in the foreign arena.
For all intensive purposes, Somalia was a political disaster for the Clinton administration. The situation created, in Halberstam’s words, “something relatively new in American foreign policy: a limited commitment to a country where we had little in the way of traditional ties and where American national security was in no way involved” (250). As a result, foreign policy was affecting how the administration was being perceived; foreign policy was creeping into domestic perceptions. To understand the importance of domestic implications with regard to Somalia, one must look to the residual hesitancy in other policy matters directly resulting from this failed commitment, especially in Rwanda and Haiti.
The issue of involvement in Rwanda was black and white. Halberstam describes the situation with a specific bluntness, saying “Washington wanted no part of Rwanda. The political fallout from Somalia had caused enough damage” (276). One specific issue describes the fragile situation of Rwanda and its relevancy to domestic politics – genocide. On the home front, the appearance of what was happening was more important than the reality. As a result, to appease domestic opposition and in response to humanitarian claims, the administration refused to use the word ‘genocide’ and dropped food to the region, although, as Halberstam notes, it was not the most pressing issue in the region (418).
Similar sentiments were expressed in Haiti, where the “geopolitical consequences of what had happened in Somalia were demonstrated almost immediately” (267). The unique domestic issue in Haiti revolved around refugees, and once again the Clinton administration was defining its foreign policy initiatives on a partially domestic basis. The ‘not Somalia again’ sentiment hung over the administration like a dark cloud, ready to pour out significant domestic unrest if not handled correctly. Each case – Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti – looks unique on the surface, but upon closer inspection, reveals the same central theme as NAFTA and Bosnia. That is, as Halberstam concludes, “the Clinton people would handle foreign policy issue by issue, with no guidelines – save the constancy of their awareness of the president’s domestic political fortunes” (241).
When viewed in the larger scope of American political history, the Clinton administration provides a unique example of a much more universal theme regarding when and where presidents devote political capital to foreign policy issues. Presidents have historically taken a dual approach to foreign policy concerns; they calculate what it can do for them, and more importantly, what it can do to them. This parallel theme extends into a number of other administrations, from Truman to Clinton. Harry Truman knew if he pursued containment with any less fervor, the domestic ramifications of being “soft” on Communism could be devastating. Lyndon Johnson felt trapped by his commitment to the escalation of Vietnam, but the domestic considerations of being the first president to lose a major war, coupled with the burden of going back on three presidents’ promises far outweighed the other options. Essentially, each of these presidents was, in one way or another, trapped by domestic politics.
Clinton was by no means an exception. This issue of Bosnia could have wounded him, but more importantly Halberstam says, “[it] might also extend into other aspects of his presidency” (307). And even after the NATO victory in Kosovo, Clinton realized there was little political capital to gain. All in all, it underscored the pervading theme that foreign policy may not necessarily help a president, but inaction would almost certainly have domestic consequences. Thus, understanding that all presidents see foreign policy as potentially harmful as well as beneficial, it is easy to find a common link between administrations. The uniqueness of the Clinton administration surfaced in various areas, but the overall theme remains: a president cannot avoid foreign policy issues, so the overriding decision of when to devote political capital to this inevitability must be understood with respect to what it can do for him, as well as what it can do to him domestically.
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