Biased history done poorly
Written: Feb 15 '04 (Updated Jun 13 '04)
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Pros: Entertainment for the knowledgeable reader. But little more.
Cons: A generally biased interpretation of World War II in the European Theater of Operations.
The Bottom Line: If you know much about World War II in Europe, it has some interesting information. And whole chapters that show extreme bias by the author. Read with great care.
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| szz's Full Review: The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Mis... |
John Mosier has published a second revisionist book on military history, this time about World War II in Europe and the Mediterranean: The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II. [0] I note problems in his discussion of two important campaigns, one lasting almost three years and the other only a few weeks:
1) Mosier not understand of the chronology of the long war in North Africa. He moves the German siege of Tobruk from 1941 to 1942. (Chapter notes correctly place it in 1941). He moves the British offensive Battleaxe from 1941 to 1942. (Pages 160-162.) Note 5 on page 184 states that Rommel arrived in North Africa in 1942, although the chapter text notes correctly that he arrived in the spring of 1941.
More interesting than a confused chronology, Mosier does not know that the Wavell/O'Connor offensive in North Africa, ending in February 1941, annihilated the Italian army in Cyrenaica. (Page 158.) This is especially interesting because this is revealed as part of a paragraph in which the author states that the "mechanization of modern warfare" made such victories impossible! [1]
Finally, Mosier implies that General Auchinleck was dismissed as commander in North Africa after losing a last battle to Rommel. Actually he was removed from command shortly after winning the First Battle of El Alamein. One excuse for ignoring this British victory is Mosier's desire to inflate the role of General Montgomery in the final victory in North Africa. Lack of knowledge about the North African campaign is another possible explanation. [2]
2) Problems I will note in Mosier's discussion of the rapid defeat of France and the evacuation of the BEF at Dunkirk have little to do with chronology and much to do with biased writing. Mosier states that panic in the French high command and government circa 15 May 1940, caused by the breaking of the French line by German Army Group A, created an unreasonable panic in the British government and in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). (Page 143.) I emphasize "unreasonable" because Mosier does not mention the defeatism of French Generals Billotte and Blanchard who respectively commanded 1 Army Group, which included the BEF, and French Army 1 on the right of the BEF. These personal factors and their impact on British generals Gort (commander of the BEF) and Ironside (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) are documented in Britain, France and Belgium 1939-1940 by Brian Bond, a book Mosier admits reading.
Mosier writes that Bond's book "reveal[s] the stereotypical British contempt for the French", (page 303). But he never refutes (much less mentions) the collapse of the two French generals, plus members of their staffs, whose cooperation and trust Gort most needed when 1 Army Group was first cut off and then denied firm direction by the French high command.
Mosier writes disapprovingly that the retreat of the BEF to Dunkirk forced the surrender of the now isolated Belgian army. For which he criticizes Gort, Churchill and "the British high command", but not Sir Roger Keys, personal friend of Leopold III of Belgium. This is true as far as it goes. Mosier does not mention that his (Mosier's) recommended strategy for the BEF, to march south (alone) across the supply lines of German Army Group A (page 143), would also have isolated the Belgian army. And was advised against by Sir Roger Keys and the Belgian high command. (Bond, page 70.)
Mosier then credits Keys for repudiating in the British Parliament the "smears the British government initially released" blaming the surrender of the Belgian army for the German victory in 1940. He does not mention that Churchill made two statements to parliament about the surrender. The _initial_ one on May 28 non-judgmental, and the second on June 4th more critical to align the official British story with that of the French government. (The two statements and the context for the second one are in Churchill's Their Finest Hour. Other relevant details are found in End of the Affair by Eleanor Gates)
I know I am down in the weeds with these complaints about the treatment of only two campaigns. Stepping back, I note that Mosier writes about the Allied bomber offensive against Germany as though he is first to record for a general audience its failure to defeat Germany despite killing hundreds of thousands of German. Others have been over this same ground before. Many times. Bomber Command by Max Hastings, 1979 is just one example.
Backing another step, I note that Mosier credits the British military thinker J.F.C. Fuller with a direct influence on every army officer who proposed a breakthrough as opposed to a broad front attack during World War II. This is a gigantic exaggeration, dependent on picking carefully selected passages from Fuller's writings. Men, Ideas and Tanks, British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939 describes Fuller's unpractical ideas and their change over time. Men, Ideas and Tanks explains how the British army tried to create realistic doctrine and hardware for armoured warfare. And failed not because it followed Fuller's ideas, but because the British government would not provide the money.
There are interesting bits in The Blitzkrieg Myth: Descriptions of doctrines and weapons of the armed forces of Finland, Holland and Belgium in 1940. A chapter mostly dedicated to French and German tank design and production. (The French built surprisingly good tanks, and many of them.) Another chapter on the preparation of fortifications by Germans on both its western and eastern borders. But much of the rest is chronologically wrong, logically wrong or factually wrong. Or just old data reformatted.
I am about to give up on this work; The Blitzkrieg Myth is difficult to review because so much is wrong! Anyway, there are good online reviews that don't go into the weeds as I have. [3]
In summary, Mosier appears to be highly selective in his use of sources and ignores rather than refutes legitimate alternative interpretations of events. He kicks the British at every possible opportunity, loves the French, and has little respect for the Americans.
Finally, what can be said for an author who describes British plans to mine Norwegian territorial waters in April 1940 as "about the most flagrant violation of international law imaginable" (page 99)? This in a book that covers a period in which Germany invaded without warnings or declarations of war Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Russia.
Steven Zoraster
[0] The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War I is the first.
[1] Some accounts report that 4 Italian tanks and 30 trucks escaped....
[2] Two good books about the war in North Africa are Desert War: The North African Campaign 1940-1943 by Alan Moorhead, and Desert Generals by Correlli Barnett.
[3] http://www.uni.edu/~licari/review17.html for example. And
http://www.washtimes.com/books/20040124-104206-7246r.htm. Plus negative reviews posted on Amazon.com.
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szz
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Member: Steven Zoraster
Location: Austin
Reviews written: 23
Trusted by: 2 members
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